Early perceptions of COVID-19 intensity and anti-Asian prejudice among White Americans.

Anecdotal reports suggested an uptick in anti-Asian prejudice corresponding with the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Examining responses from White U.S. citizens (N = 589) during the first months of the pandemic, this study tested: (a) whether actual intensity (official number of cases or deaths reported) or perceived intensity (participants' estimates of the same) of the COVID-19 outbreak predicted indicators of racial outgroup prejudice, particularly those associated with cross-group interaction, (b) whether outgroup prejudice was oriented toward Asian people specifically, or toward racial outgroups more broadly (e.g., toward both Asian people and Black people), and (c) whether contact with racial outgroups moderated relations between COVID-19 intensity and racial prejudice. Results showed that perceived COVID-19 intensity was associated with prejudice indicators representing the desire for social distance from Asian people, as well as from Black people, yet it was unrelated to reports of negative affect toward either racial outgroup. These patterns support the idea that prejudice during periods of disease outbreak might functionally serve to reduce willingness for interaction with, and likelihood of infection from, racial outgroups. Contact moderated the relation between official reports of COVID-19 intensity and support for anti-China travel policies, such that greater contact with Asian people was associated with less support for exclusionary, anti-China travel policies when actual COVID-19 intensity was high. Overall, these results suggest that intensity of disease threat can exacerbate racial outgroup prejudice and reduce willingness for cross-group interaction, but that intergroup contact may sometimes provide a prejudice-attenuating effect.

Children strategically conceal selfishness.

Can children exploit knowledge asymmetries to get away with selfishness? This question was addressed by testing 6- to 9-year-old children (N = 164; 81 girls) from the Northeastern United States in a modified Ultimatum Game. Children were assigned to the roles of proposers (who offered some proportion of an endowment) and responders (who could accept or reject offers). Both players in the Informed condition knew the endowment quantity in each trial. However, in the Uninformed condition, only proposers knew this information. In this condition, many proposers made "strategically selfish" offers that seemed fair based on the responders' incomplete knowledge but were actually highly selfish. These results indicate that even young children possess the ability to deceive others about their selfishness.

Author Correction: Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game.

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.

Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game.

Human adults use a range of social cues to obtain information about potential partners in cooperative contexts: we prefer partners who are competent, wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules. One factor that carries particular weight is whether a prospective partner is fair. Here we ask whether children share this preference for fair partners and, if so, whether a prospective partner's past fair behaviour influences children's behaviour in a cooperative dilemma. Six- to nine-year-olds chose between partners who accepted or rejected resource allocations that were either strongly advantageously unequal, strongly disadvantageously unequal, or equal. They then played a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game with their chosen partner. Children overwhelmingly preferred to play with the partner who accepted rather than rejected allocations. Regardless of their partner choice decisions, children tended to defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, yet expected that their partners would be relatively more cooperative. Finally, children were more likely to cooperate with those they believed would cooperate. Together, these findings shed new light on the links between partner choice, fairness and cooperation in child development.

Ingroup bias does not influence inequity aversion in children.

Ingroup favoritism influences third-party norm enforcement: Third-party punishers are more lenient when an ingroup member has been unfair. By contrast, in 2-party contexts, where punishers are the victims of unfairness, group bias effects are absent or inconsistent. Thus, group bias appears to be particularly influential when enforcing fairness among others, but less so when protecting oneself from unfairness. This would have implications for theories of how cooperation and intergroup cognition interact, but a more direct empirical test is lacking. To this end, developmental data are particularly useful as they can tell us whether and if so how group bias and fairness norm enforcement are related from their first emergence. Using a minimal groups manipulation, we induced ingroup bias in 6- to 9-year-olds and tested their willingness to reject disadvantageous (more for you) and advantageous (more for me) resource allocations when paired with in- and outgroup members. Group bias did not affect children's rejections of unfair allocations, although they reported that it was worse when an outgroup member had more. Our findings suggest that ingroup bias does not influence children's costly endorsement of equality, indicating that children perceive the equality norm to be indiscriminate and enforceable across group boundaries. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Worth the wait: Children trade off delay and reward in self- and other-benefiting decisions.

Human prosocial behaviors are supported by early-emerging psychological processes that detect and fulfill the needs of others. However, little is known about the mechanisms that enable children to deliver benefits to others at costs to the self, which requires weighing other-regarding and self-serving preferences. We used an intertemporal choice paradigm to systematically study and compare these behaviors in 5-year-old children. Our results show that other-benefiting and self-benefiting behavior share a common decision-making process that integrates delay and reward. Specifically, we found that children sought to minimize delay and maximize reward, and traded off delays against rewards, regardless of whether these rewards were for the children themselves or another child. However, we found that children were more willing to invest their time to benefit themselves than someone else. Together, these findings show that from childhood, other- and self-serving decisions are supported by a general mechanism that flexibly integrates information about the magnitude of rewards, and the opportunity costs of pursuing them. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/r8S0DGe7f8Q.